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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030851-CA
v.
LEWIS RICKY DURAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of aggravated arson, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (2003). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)0) (2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Should this Court consider defendant's claim of insufficient evidence where he
has not marshaled the evidence in favor of the jury's verdict?
In the alternative, was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated
arson of his own apartment, where he was about to be forcibly evicted, had already
vandalized the apartment and threatened his neighbors, and was seen in the apartment
just before the fire started?
In reviewing a claim for insufficient evidence, this Court ccview[s] the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Holgate

2000 UT 74, 1118, 10 P.3d 346. This Court may reverse the jury's verdict only if ctthe
evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.955 Id. at
1118 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Defendant's appeal requires application of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (1999), which
states the following:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the
offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 1,2003, defendant was charged with one count of Aggravated Arson, a first
degree felony (R.l-2). At his jury trial, defendant presented no evidence and never moved
for a directed verdict (R. 136:164-65). The jury convicted him as charged (R. 74, 83,
136:204-205). The court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term (R. 90, 138:8).
Defendant timely appealed to this Court (R. 93). This Court transferred the case the Utah
Supreme Court, which poured the case back over to this Court (R. 100; Order, dated
December 4, 2003, Case No. 20030851-SC).1

1

The pour-over order is not in the trial court record.
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early hours of March 31, 2003, a fire destroyed the interior of defendant's
apartment (R. 136:111-12, 135-50). The fire marshals determined that the fire was
intentionally started (R. 136:158). When police located and took defendant into custody on
suspicion of arson, he told them that he no longer wanted to pay for food and rent and
demanded, "[T]ake me to fucking jail" (R. 136:84).
Defendant was being evicted
Defendant moved into apartment number two at 2621 Madison in July 2002 (R.
136:107-08). He made regular rental payments at first, but later slipped behind and made
only small partial payments (R. 136:109). In early March 2003, the landlord instituted
eviction proceedings against defendant (R. 136:115-120, Stated Ex. No. 1). Defendant
received a three-day notice to pay rent or quit on March 4,2003 (R. 136:116-17). Defendant
did not respond to the notice (R. 136:117). Subsequently, defendant's landlord served him
with a summons and order on March 18, requesting a response within three days (R. State's
Ex. No.l). Defendant filed a delinquent response on March 24, 2003 (R. 136:118). On
March 25,2003, officials served defendant with an order of restitution giving him three days
to evacuate the apartment (R. State's Ex. No. 1). The order stated that if defendant failed to
evacuate within the three-day period, law enforcement officials would force him off the
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premises (R. State's Ex. No. 1). Defendant's landlord planned to have the sheriff forcibly
remove defendant from the apartment on March 31, 2003 (R. 136:119).
During this same time period, the other tenants reported that defendant became more
and more antagonistic (R. 136:21-22,61-64). He made rude comments and threatened some
of the tenants (R. 136:21-22, 61-64.). Defendant said to one female tenant, "Just you wait,
I 'm going to split that butt wide open" (R. 136:21). He later accused that tenant's husband of
stealing his papers and said, "I don't care if you're the one that done it or not, if it happens
again, I'm coming after you" (R. 136:22). Another tenant recalled, "I was walking down to
the bus stop . . . and [defendant] got up in my face saying, I'm going to get you, I'm going to
get you" (R. 136:63). Defendant also started banging on his pipes at two and three o'clock in
the morning (R. 136:62-63). The banging started in February two or three times a week (R.
136:62). By March, defendant would bang on his pipes every night (R. 136:22, 62-63).
Defendant was acting "weird"
On March 31, 2003, shortly after 1:00 a.m., Robert Nelson visited defendant's
apartment complex to borrow a pack of cigarettes from Scott Cole, defendant's neighbor (R.
136:28-29, 41-42, 65-67). Nelson passed defendant in the hallway on the way to Cole's
apartment. (R. 136:30-31). He said "hi" to defendant, but defendant did not respond (R.
Officer Rustin Olson testified that at the time of the fire the landlord told him
defendant had been evicted the morning of March 30, 2003 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 136:87).
However, the laadlord's testimony at trial indicated that the forcible eviction had not yet
occurred at the time of the fire and that it was to occur at 9:30 a.m. the morning the fire
started (R. 136:119). Officer Olson admitted that he wrote the report at five o'clock in the
morning and that it contained a mistake (R. 136:87).
4

136:30-31). Defendant was acting "weird," repeatedly "coming out of his house . . . and
onto the porch [,] looking around [,] shifting his feet, [then] turning around [and] going back
into the apartment

as if he was waiting for something or someone" (R. 136:30-31, 57).

Robert explained to defendant that he was "just going to be a minute, I'm visiting a friend"
(R. 136:31). He felt like he was interrupting something (R. 136:31). When Robert departed
around 1:10 or 1:15 a.m., defendant was still acting "weird," pacing in and out of his
apartment (R. 136:31,57).
At 1:29 a.m. one of defendant's neighbor's, Melissa Snuffer, awoke to the smell of
smoke and called 911 to report a fire (R. 136:19,75). Police officers arrived around 1:30 a.m.
and assisted Melissa and her fiancee in waking and evacuating the other apartment residents
(R. 136:74-76). Nobody could find defendant, and Melissa could not get his apartment door
open (R. 136:20-21, 24-25). By the time the police officers had evacuated everybody, the
fire department had located the fire in defendant's apartment and put it out (R. 136:76).
Fire marshals arrived at 3:00 a.m. to locate the cause of the fire (R. 136:135). They
determined that the fire began in a pile of garbage behind the couch and next to the kitchen
(R. 136:140,142-153,157; State's Ex. Nos. 2-13). Marshals concluded from the lack of any
evidence of an accidental cause that the fire was intentionally started (R. 136:139, 158).
They also found several holes in defendant's apartment walls (R. 136:146). The holes were
not there when defendant moved into the apartment (R. 136:113).

5

"Take meto...

jail."

While the fire marshals were conducting their inspection, defendant returned to his
apartment and asked what was going on (R. 136:159). The marshals responded that they
were "investigating a fire and he needed to step out of the house" (R. 136:159). Defendant
told them to "get the T' out, [they] had no right to be in his home" (R. 136:160). The
marshals stepped out of the apartment and called the police (R. 136:160).
Police officers returned and took defendant into custody (R. 136:81). Defendant was
jumpy and emotional (R. 136:83). He told officers that he left his apartment at midnight to
go buy methamphetamine (R. 136:82). He claimed that his friend Shaun Peat was at the
apartment when he left (R. 136:83). The interviewing officer then asked defendant if he left
his oven on or if he smoked cigarettes (R. 136:83-84). Defendant cut him off and said
"who's fucking dick do I have to suck to go to prison?" (R. 136:83-84). He continued and
explained that he did not want to have to pay for rent or food and he "couldn't sling enough
dope to support his own habit" (R. 136:84). He then demanded, "[TJake me to fucking jail"
(R. 136:84).
During the subsequent investigation, the State learned that Shaun Peat, defendant's
alibi, was in De Soto, Illinois at the time of the fire (R. 136:124-25).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence supporting the jury verdict.
Defendant has the burden, when claiming insufficient evidence, to present every scrap of
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evidence introduced at trial that supports the jury's verdict. Defendant has not done so, and
this Court should therefore refuse to review his insufficiency claim.
Further, even assuming defendant properly marshaled the evidence, his insufficiency
claim would still fail because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict.
Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the fair inferences of the
evidence have a basis in logic and human experience. In the instant case, defendant was seen
in his apartment shortly before the fire started. He was being evicted by his landlord and had
already vandalized the apartment and threatened his neighbors. Defendant later told police
that he could no longer afford food, rent, or drugs and asked to be taken to jail. The fair
inference from the evidence is that defendant started the fire out of desperation and as an act
of malice towards his landlord and the other residents in the building.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE; MOREOVER, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS MERITLESS
BECAUSE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
HIM
Defendant claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of
aggravated arson. Aplt. Br. at 8. Specifically, he argues that "[t]he evidence against [him]
was circumstantial" because "[t]here were no witnesses to the fire." Aplt. Br. at 8.
Defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve his claim in the trial court by moving for a
directed verdict. Aplt. Br. at 8. He contends, however, that his trial attorney was ineffective
for not filing a directed verdict motion. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. In the alternative, he claims the
7

trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte dismissing the case at the close of the
State's evidence. Aplt. Br. at 9.
This Court should refuse to address defendant's sufficiency claim because he failed to
marshal the evidence. Even if defendant had marshaled the evidence, however, his claims of
ineffectiveness and plain error still fail because the evidence was sufficient.
A. This Court need not reach defendant's sufficiency claim because
defendant failed to marshal the evidence.
"It is well established that a defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict" State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, H 25, 13 P.3d 604 (quotations
omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, II40,47 P.3d 115 (holding that when
a defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, he must "marshal all relevant
evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the
findings are clearly erroneous" (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d
1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991)). "To meet this burden, an appellant 'must present in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists.5" Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, H 40
(quoting West Valley City 818 P.2d at 1315). "After compiling all evidence in support of the
verdict, the appellant must then show that there is a flaw in the evidence, sufficient to show
that the verdict is clearly erroneous." Id.; see also State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 (Utah
App. 1991) (holding that when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence he
8

must marshal all evidence, including circumstantial evidence). Defendant has failed to meet
this burden.
Though defendant lists some evidence introduced at trial, he fails to include all of the
evidence supporting the jury's finding. For example, defendant fails to mention that
defendant's door could not be opened when his neighbor, the first person at defendant's
apartment, tried to notify defendant of the fire (R. 136:20, 24-25). Instead, his brief only
states that he often kept his door open and that the police found the door unlocked. Aplt. Br.
at 13. Further, defendant mentions only two eviction notifications. Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant
actually received three eviction notices (R. State's Ex. No. 1). Defendant also fails to include
any evidence of his antagonistic behavior leading up to commission of the crime, such as the
nightly banging on pipes and the fire investigator's discovery of several holes in his
apartment walls (R.136: 20, 62-63, 68-69).
Because defendant failed to meet his burden to adequately marshal the evidence, this
court should refuse to review defendant's sufficiency claim. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT
98, f 16, 989 P.2d 1065 (declining to review sufficiency of evidence where defendant does
not marshal evidence).
B. The properly marshaled evidence was sufficient to convict defendant
Even had defendant properly marshaled the evidence, defendant's claim would fail
because the evidence demonstrates he committed the crime.
This court "will not lightly overturn a jury verdict." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, H
42, 994 P.2d 177; see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (holding a

9

defendant claiming insufficient evidence "faces a high hurdle in establishing this claim").
"This [C]ourt has limited authority to examine a jury verdict challenged on the sufficiency of
the evidence." Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472. It must therefore "view[ ] the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." Holgate, 2000
UT 74, If 18. It may reverse a jury verdict only if "the evidence i s sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id. at HI8 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1212); see also Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472; Colwell 2000 UT 8,11 42; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
at 344; State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1986); State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 875, 875
(Utah 1983) (holding that court may only reverse arson conviction if "reasonable minds must
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt"). Thus, "[wjhen findings of
all required elements of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, [appellate courts] stop their inquiry and
sustain the verdict." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, H42.
"[I]t is a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused." Nickles 728 P.2d at 126; see also Brown, 948 P.2d at 344
(holding that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence"); Scheel, 823
P.2d at 472. "Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of
such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and is sufficient to sustain the conviction." Nickles, 728 P.2d at 127; see also State v. Span,
819 P.2d 329,332 (Utah 1991) (same). To decide whether sufficient circumstantial evidence
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exists, this Court determines "(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every
element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each
legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown, 948 P.2d at 344.
"Utah Courts have determined that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain an
arson conviction." Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472; see also Span, 819 P.2d at 332-33 (holding
evidence sufficient to prove aggravated arson where evidence included defendant's anger
over breakup with girlfriend, his prior vandalism of her car, and his proximity to her
apartment the night of the fire); Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126-27 (noting in arson case "a wellsettled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused . . . if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction"); State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d
892, 892-93 (Utah 1986) (finding "substantial credible evidence" to sustain arson conviction
where there was a threat to cause fire, timely opportunity, and handprint); State v. Clark, 675
P.2d 557, 562 (Utah 1983) (finding sufficient evidence to convict where evidence
demonstrated that accelerants were used, defendants were present, and defendants' legs were
burned); State v. Dronzank, 671 P.2d 199,200 (Utah 1983) ("In viewing the case in light of
the totality of the evidence, the offense may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such
evidence may be the only way of establishing a case of [aggravated] arson, which usually is
based on secret preparation and activity."); State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 510,511 (Utah App.
1989) (sufficient evidence to convict homeowner of aggravated arson where fire started from
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spilt oil on carpet in home shortly after homeowners left on vacation); State v. Morehouse,
748 P.2d 217, 218-19 (Utah App. 1988) (holding evidence sufficient where witnesses saw
defendant enter and leave burned building at time of fire and defendant had possible financial
motive).
Aggravated arson occurs when a person "by means of fire or explosives . . .
intentionally and unlawfully damages: (a) a habitable structure; or (b) any structure or vehicle
when any person not a participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-103 (2003). Defendant does not dispute that the fire damaged a habitable
structure. He claims only that the evidence was insufficient to prove "how the fire was
started or who was responsible for starting it." Aplt. Br. at 16.
Although nobody saw defendant start the fire, the properly marshaled evidence is
sufficient for a jury to infer that defendant intentionally started the fire in his apartment.
Defendant had become increasingly antagonistic towards the other tenants and abusive
towards the apartment (R. 136:21-22, 61-64). Defendant kept the other tenants up at night
by banging on his pipes, and fire investigators found several holes in defendant's apartment
walls that were not there when he moved into the apartment (R. 136:22, 62-63, 113).
Defendant also made rude comments to or physically threatened at least three of his
neighbors (R. 136:21-22, 61-64).
In March, defendant's landlord instituted eviction proceedings against him. Defendant
received notices on March 4 and March 18 demanding that he pay rent or evacuate the
premises (R. 136:115-20; State's Ex. No. 1). He received a final notice on March 25,2003,
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telling him to evacuate the premises within three business days or he would be forced to
leave (R. State's Ex. No. 1). Three business days later defendant still inhabited the apartment
(R. 136:118-19; State's Ex. No. 1).
Defendant was in or near his apartment shortly before the fire started. Robert Nelson
saw defendant pacing in and out of his apartment around 1:10-1:15 in the morning when he
left Scott Cole's apartment (R. 136:31, 57).3 At 1:29 a.m., one of defendant's neighbor's,
Melissa Snuffer, awoke to the smell of smoke and called 911 to report a fire (R. 136:19,75).
Scott Cole testified that someone alerted him to the fire about ten minutes after Robert
Nelson left his apartment (R. 136:58). When Melissa evacuated the other residents during
the fire, she could not open defendant's door (R. 136:20-21).
Fire Marshal Matthew Schwenk testified that the origin of the fire was a pile of
garbage on the floor in between the couch and the kitchen (R. 136:137, 139). He found no
evidence that the garbage ignited from an electrical short or other accidental cause (R.
136:152). While he could not be sure of the exact mechanism that ignited the fire, he
testified without contradiction that the fire was intentionally started (R. 136:158).
Defendant made incriminating statements to the police after the fire. At first,
defendant lied to police about having an alibi. He claimed that Shaun Peat was at his
apartment when he left before the fire started (R. 136:83). However, Shaun's testimony, as
well as that of his parole officer, revealed that he was not in Utah, but in De Soto, Illinois
Scott Cole testified that he keeps his clock set ahead about ten to fifteen minutes
depending on the clock. R. 136:72. The clock read 1:25 when Robert Nelson arrived, so it
could have been as early as 1:10 in the morning (R. 136:72).
13

that day (R. 136:124-25). Defendant then spontaneously exclaimed, "[Wjho's fucking dick
do I have to suck to go to prison?" (R. 136:84.). He stated that he did not want to have to pay
for rent or food and he "couldn't sling enough dope to support his own habit" (R. 136:84).
He then demanded, "[T]ake me to fucking jail" (R. 136:84).
Defendant was also antagonistic towards the fire marshals. When he returned to his
apartment, he told the marshals to "get the T ' out, [they] had no right to be in his home" and
impeded their investigation (R. 136:160).
The jury could logically and reasonably infer from the evidence that defendant
intentionally set his apartment on fire. First, they could infer that he was motivated by malice
to start the fire. He was upset with his neighbors and had reason to be upset with his
landlord. He had also previously vandalized the apartment and antagonized his neighbors.
The jury could also infer that defendant started the fire as a desperate plan to use
imprisonment as a welfare system. He was facing eminent eviction from his home and could
no longer afford to buy food, pay rent, or support his drug habit. When the police caught
defendant, he explained his desperate circumstances and demanded that they take him to jail.
The jury could also infer from defendant's actions after the fire that he was trying to
hide the source of the fire and his proximity to it. Defendant lied to police to hide the fact
that he was in his apartment shortly before the fire started. He also drove the fire marshals
out of his apartment so that they could not discover the source and cause of the fire.
The State's evidence permitted the jury to infer that defendant had a motive to start the
fire and that he attempted to hide the evidence of arson. A conclusion of guilt from these
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inferences is strengthened by Nelson's observation that defendant was nervously pacing in
and out of his apartment just before the fire started. The confluence of motive, culpable
conduct, and proximity to the fire make it logical and reasonable to infer that defendant
intentionally started the fire.
Courts have sustained convictions for arson on less evidence than was presented in the
instant case. For example, in State v. Span, the Utah Supreme Court held that the following
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated arson of his
girlfriend's apartment: 1) fire investigators found the fire was intentionally set; 2) Span was
upset about a recent break-up with his girlfriend nine days before the fire; 3) sometime
between the break-up and the fire, the defendant committed two acts of vandalism against his
girlfriend's car; 4) defendant admitted to a witness that he had driven to his girlfriend's
apartment sometime near the time of the fire. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332-33. The court
concluded that, though the circumstantial evidence used to convict the defendant was "close
on the issues of whether the fire was arson and whether Span was the perpetrator of the
arson, 'there [was] some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime [could] reasonably be made

'" Id. at 333 (quoting

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (alterations in original, emphasis added); see
also Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 218-19 (holding evidence sufficient to identify defendant as
arsonist where witnesses saw defendant enter and leave burned building at time of fire and
defendant had possible financial motive).
Thus defendant's claim fails.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2-5 day of June 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
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